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There is no good faith in America, nor among the 
nations of America. Treaties are scraps of paper; 
constitutions, printed matter; elections, battles; 
freedom, anarchy; and life, a torment. 
 
                                                        Simón Bolivar  
 
 
 
  
 Introduction 
 
 The history of most Latin American countries during the early decades of the 
nineteenth century is characterized by the persistent failure to create a relatively 
stable constitutional order. The typical image of the process that followed 
independence from Spain is one of a fierce struggle between opposing groups, 
liberals and conservatives, federalists and centralists, constantly writing and re-
writing constitutional rules according to the shifting balance of forces. In the midst 
of this conflict, Latin America became a fertile ground of institutional 
experimentation in almost every possible area of constitutional design, from 
monarchies to republics to different variants of federalism and centralism, 
unipersonal and collegial executives, unicameral and bicameral legislatures. 
Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, however, a more or less 
dominant institutional paradigm emerged: that of a presidential republic based on the 
separation of powers principle. Different historical factors, common to most 
countries of the region, converge to explain the adoption of this general model. 
 With few exceptions—Brazil and, to some extent, Mexico, the most preferred 
option among Latin American elites after the 1820s was the creation of a republic 
rather than some form of constitutional monarchy. This option somewhat constrained 
the range of constitutional models in which the framers could find inspiration. Only 
the American constitution provided the example of a prosperous and politically 
stable republic. No parallel example existed in France, where the brief and quite 
unhappy experience with a parliamentary republic after the revolution was followed 
by the plebiscitary dictatorship of Napoleon, the restoration of traditional monarchy, 
and the constitutional monarchy of Louis Philippe. At the same time, important 
aspects of the American constitution seemed to fit local conditions and past 
institutional experience. Such was the case of a unipersonal executive whose election 
and duration in office was independent of the legislature. In a context of permanent 
external threats and internal conflict, most countries learned that collegial executives 
and executives controlled by legislative assemblies were often unable to provide for 
a strong, stable government.  
 There is little doubt, however, that the adoption of the American constitution in 
Spanish America was selective from the very beginning. Most new republics created a 
presidential office that was much stronger than its American counterpart.  In the area of 
government, most Spanish American constitutions granted the president the power to 
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appoint cabinet ministers and top administrative officials without any form of 
congressional approval, and unilateral command over the army to intervene in external or 
internal conflicts. In terms of legislation, most presidents received formal authority to 
initiate bills in congress, exclusive initiative on budgets, and the authority to convene 
congress for extraordinary sessions to deliberate on matters proposed by the president. 
Finally, the typical president in Spanish America enjoyed discretionary emergency 
powers. These centralizing institutions clearly signaled a common concern of the framers 
for political order and stability.     
 These general features, however, are insufficient to account for variations in 
constitutional choice. The design of executive powers varied widely across 
constitutions in almost every aspect, from duration in office and term limits to 
powers of government, legislation, and emergency. In addition, most constitutions 
adopted different versions of separation of powers and check and balances 
principles, as well as different frameworks for organizing the relation between 
central government and local powers. Given this variation, one cannot rely on 
ideology or historical conditions alone to understand the origin of these institutions.  
 This article seeks to explain the particular model of distribution of powers that 
emerged from the constitution-making process of 1853-60 in Argentina. I will focus 
on two of the central characteristics of this design: the structure of presidential 
powers and the institutions that regulate the relations between the central 
government and regional units. In both dimensions, I will show that the constitution 
of 1853-60 represented a tension between power-concentrating and power-sharing 
structures of government, a somewhat odd combination of elements of presidential 
dominance and centralism with principles of checks and balances and federalism.  
 I will argue that the most general aspects of this design reflected a shared 
understanding among political actors about the institutions that could best fit the 
historical conditions of Argentina. In this sense, both the regime type and some basic 
options of design were greatly influenced by a conservative, “state-building” version 
of liberalism overly concerned with political order and government stability in a 
context of territorial fragmentation and inter-elite conflict. Matters of detail and 
distributional issues, however, were shaped by a self-interested bargain among actors 
with different expectations about the future and various levels of bargaining power 
to make their institutional preferences prevail. From this point of view, I will argue 
that the power-concentrating aspects of the constitution emerged as a consequence of 
the influence that the future president had over the organization of the constituent 
process and the task of constitutional design. The power-sharing aspects of the 
constitution, instead, emerged from necessary concessions made by the future 
president to his local supporters and from the veto power of the leaders of Buenos 
Aires, who expected to be a minority in the future government. 
 I will divide this article in four sections. Section I briefly considers the 
institutional conflicts that from 1810 to 1852 characterized the interaction between 
Buenos Aires and the rest of the provinces.  Section II analyzes the bargaining 
process and procedures that shaped the making of the constitution of 1853. Section 
III explains the impasse that preceded the reform of the constitution in 1860 and the 
final integration of Buenos Aires to the federation. Section IV concludes with an 
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analysis of the impact of the constitution of 1853-60 on the future stability of the 
liberal regime that followed its creation. 
 
 
1. The stalemate between Buenos Aires and the provinces (1810-1852) 
 
 Let me start with a brief presentation of events. As head of a centralist and 
absolutist empire, the fall of the Spanish monarchy left no legitimate local or 
national institutions in place from where to start the task of national organization. 
The independence of the Viceroyalty of River Plate, as everywhere else in Spanish 
America, was immediately followed by a gradual disintegration of large 
administrative divisions into new entities claiming autonomy from their former 
political centers and participation in the formation of national authorities. Federalism 
was the natural choice for these actors. Yet, groups that had access to the main 
centers of economic and political power during the colony resisted this form of 
government. These groups wanted to retain control over the central government, and 
therefore rejected local demands of autonomy and representation at the national level 
(Safford 1974: 102-111). Different from the process of constitution-making in the 
former British colonies of North America, this struggle for the division of political 
power was not constrained by previous forms of organization and representation 
(like local legislatures or other constituted authorities) that could be accepted as 
starting points of discussion or as focal points of agreement on which the actors 
could rely to resolve their disputes. From this perspective, the final form of 
organization of the national state in Latin America was, as it were, up for grabs. 1 
 Since the revolution of 1810, the political elite of Buenos Aires, main 
international port and center of economic, administrative, and military power of the 
former Viceroyalty of River Plate, attempted to monopolize the conduction of 
national events. In this sense, for instance, the leaders of Buenos Aires reserved for 
themselves a key position in every—provisional- national authority 
created.2Representing the province with the largest population, they often did so by 
establishing a rule of proportional representation in constituent bodies. In 1819, 
while national forces were still fighting against the Spanish army, a constituent 
Congress dominated by delegates from Buenos Aires created a centralist constitution 
that let the provinces without any significant sphere of representation as independent 
political units.3 Although porteño (inhabitants of the city of Buenos Aires) leaders 
managed to obtain some support in the interior of the country, the provinces of the 
littoral, which did not attend the sessions, rejected this constitution and threatened 
the formation of an independent state, perhaps in association with Uruguay, former 
governorship of the Viceroyalty. Two years later, after a period of civil war that 
followed the fall of national authorities, a new plan to call a constituent Congress 
                                                
1 On the particularities of the process of nation-building and constitution-making in Spanish America, 
2 Such was the case with the first national institutions, like the juntas, triumvirates, and directorates. 
3 The provinces received only a partial form of representation in the Senate of a bicameral legislature. 
For more details about this design, see Sampay (1975).  
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was made. However, the attempt to provide this Congress with equal representation 
from all the provinces failed due to the opposition of Buenos Aires.  
 In 1826, after a period in which most provinces were already existing as de facto 
independent political units, a new constituent Congress was formed to provide the 
country with a national constitution. This Congress, organized and controlled by 
Buenos Aires, produced a constitution that, though centralist, contained several 
concessions to the provinces. In the first place, it created a national president, 
selected by electors from the provinces, and a bicameral legislature with a Senate 
with equal representation for the provinces. It also federalized the city of Buenos 
Aires, from then on capital of the nation, and divided the province of Buenos Aires 
into two different provinces. Finally, and crucially from the point of view of the 
economic interests of the provinces, the new constitution nationalized the revenues 
of the customhouse of Buenos Aires, the most important source or revenues in the 
country.  
 The new constitution, however, did not recognize the right of the people of the 
provinces to elect their own governors. In its final design, governors would be 
appointed by the president, from a list of candidates provided by provincial councils 
of administration (Sampay 1975). Both the littoral and interior provinces rejected the 
new constitution and, like in 1819, all national authorities were suspended. The 
difference with the previous situation, however, was that one of the main centers of 
opposition to the centralist constitution came now from the province of Buenos Aires 
itself. In reaction to the nationalization of the rents of the port of Buenos Aires, the 
cattle producers of this province rebelled against the centralist party and managed to 
obtain the election of the estanciero (rancher) Juan Manuel de Rosas as governor of 
Buenos Aires (Burgin 1960: 41).  
 Once in power, Juan Manuel de Rosas (1829-1832/1835-1852) initiated a long 
pause in the struggle for the constitution, by succeeding in creating an informal 
confederation in alliance with the provinces. In 1831, a federal pact was signed 
between Buenos Aires and the littoral provinces and later accepted by the rest of the 
provinces. The pact created a Representative Commission, a sort of national 
deliberative body composed by delegates from all the provinces in equal 
representation. It also established the provisional delegation of the conduction of 
foreign affairs to the governor of Buenos Aires, who de facto became the national 
executive authority. The central purpose of the agreement was to signal the 
commitment of all the parties involved to call as soon as possible a constituent 
Congress to create a federal constitution.  
 Through time, however, only the power delegated to the governor of Buenos 
Aires remained. While paying lip service to the federal cause, Rosas dismantled the 
Representative Commission and consciously aborted the creation of a federal 
constitution. With the economic power of the province intact, by the 1840s, Rosas 
managed to build an important army and gain gradual political hegemony over the 
rest of the provinces by a wise combination of pacts of mutual protection with 
provincial caudillos and distribution of economic benefits among supporters. The 
most powerful competitors in the provinces disappeared and different rebellions in 
the interior and the littoral were defeated one after another. For the first time, some 
form of national government with control over the provinces seemed to be in place 
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(Linch 1985: 644). Rosas´ rule, however, was weaker than it seemed to be. Rosas 
depended too much on the support of the governor of Entre Ríos, Justo José de 
Urquiza, to maintain control over the littoral provinces, whose economic interests 
were increasingly at odds with those of Buenos Aires (Donghi 1982: 394). While 
Entre Ríos was experiencing a period of rapid economic growth based on cattle 
production, further economic expansion depended on the opening of the Paraná 
River, whose navigation and trade Rosas restricted.  
 The opportunity to alter the existing balance of forces emerged during the 
1840s, when Rosas intervened in the internal politics of Uruguay to place an ally 
government in this country. Uruguay, like Brazil, shared with the littoral provinces 
an interest in breaking the blockade of Buenos Aires over the navigation of the River 
Plate system. Brazil, in addition, saw the intervention of Buenos Aires in Uruguay as 
a potential threat to its traditional hegemonic influence over the internal affairs of 
this country (Donghi 1982: 398). It was in this context that after a previous alliance 
with Uruguay and Brazil, in May of 1851, Urquiza suspended the delegation made in 
1831 to the governor of Buenos Aires to conduct the foreign relations of his 
province. Soon after, Corrientes followed the example and a coalition formed by 
Corrientes, Entre Ríos, Uruguay and Brazil declared war against Rosas. In February 
of 1852, the allied forces defeated Rosas in the battle of Caseros. 
 
 
2. Breaking the deadlock: the constitution of 1853 
 
 Whereas in the past Buenos Aires failed to gain sufficient support to establish a 
centralist constitution, the defeat of Buenos Aires under the leadership of Urquiza 
opened the opportunity to create a federal constitution accepted by the majority of 
the provinces. The feasibility of this task, however, was not immediately evident. On 
the one hand, the use of military force could be only a temporary solution to break 
the opposition of Buenos Aires. In the long run, military defeat must be transformed 
into some form of voluntary agreement. On the other hand, the making of a federal 
constitution could be also frustrated by the emergence of internal conflicts within the 
federalist coalition itself. Although it was in their interest to support a federal 
constitution, potential internal divisions, as in the past, could be exploited by Buenos 
Aires to produce the collapse of the coalition.4 From the point of view of Urquiza, 
then, the creation and sustainability of the new constitution depended on his success 
in two interrelated bargaining processes: one internal to the coalition itself, in order 
to keep his supporters together, another external, between the federalist coalition and 
Buenos Aires. This success, in turn, depended on the powers he would be able to 
obtain in exchange for certain concessions to provincial leaders and on the resources 
that the coalition itself could use to induce Buenos Aires to accept an agreement. 
  
                                                
4 In this respect, one should note that Urquiza did not get significant support from the provinces in his 
war against Buenos Aires and that, moreover, many provincial leaders were loyal to Rosas until the 
very end. 
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In this context, the first step of Urquiza was to make clear to provincial 
governors that he will respect the positions of power they enjoyed in their provinces 
as long as they provided him with support to institutionalize a federal state. As a 
result of this implicit agreement, on April 6, the littoral provinces appointed Urquiza 
as “provisional” director of the confederation and delegated on him the power to 
conduct their foreign affairs. This action broke with the established tradition of 
delegating that function to the governor of Buenos Aires. In early May, Urquiza used 
his influence to get Vicente Lopez y Planes, a porteño supporter of the federalist 
cause, elected governor of Buenos Aires. The most important support received by 
Urquiza, however, occurred in late May, when he gathered all provincial governors 
in San Nicolas de los Arroyos to sign the pact that would establish the basic 
procedures of the future constituent convention.   
 This pact represented a conscious attempt to design a constituent convention in 
which neither Buenos Aires could make its preferences prevail nor the particular 
demands of provincial delegates would put obstacles to the rapid adoption of a new 
constitution. The most important rules of this design were as follows: 
 
1. Rules of representation. According to the pact, each province would elect two 
delegates to the convention. In contrast to the rule of proportional 
representation, always used by Buenos Aires to manipulate the work of 
constituent conventions, this mechanism guaranteed the equal representation 
of all provinces, regardless of population or economic importance. It also 
meant the formation of a very small assembly, with a maximum of 28 
delegates, if all the provinces sent the required number. 
2. Procedure of selection of delegates. Delegates would be elected according to 
the rules for the election of representatives to provincial legislatures. In 
principle, this meant direct election by the people of the provinces. In fact, 
however, the governors themselves would intervene as electors. The 
agreement implicitly allowed the governors to intervene (to use “legitimate” 
influence was the actual wording of the pact) in the election, as they were 
used to do. Through their intervention, the governors (and through them, 
Urquiza) could secure the selection of delegates loyal to the federal cause. 
3. Proscription of binding mandates. Delegates to the convention could not use 
specific instructions of their provinces to vote in the convention. This 
measure was obviously aimed at facilitating internal negotiations as well as 
precluding the use of instructions as a precommitment device. 
4. Internal procedures. A simple majority of votes would approve the 
constitution. This constraint over the decision rules of the assembly had the 
clear purpose of diminishing the bargaining power of any opposing minority 
(mainly, but not only, the delegates from Buenos Aires) in the convention.  
5. Absence of ratification procedures. Different from previous constitutional 
assemblies, the ratification of provincial legislatures was eliminated as 
requirement for approval. This was perhaps the most conscious attempt to 
prevent any form of opposition coming from the provinces in general and 
Buenos Aires in particular. The rule also implied something about the nature 
of the constituent power that would create the new constitution. The ultimate 
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source of authority of the constitution would reside in the nation, not in the 
provinces.  
 
Urquiza himself was endowed with important means to protect-and potentially 
influence- the work of the assembly. For instance, he received authority to control 
internal order in the country while the assembly was fulfilling its mission. Appointed 
as commander in chief of all provincial armies, Urquiza could use any means 
necessary to restore peace in case of armed conflicts or rebellions. In addition, 
Urquiza was confirmed as provisional director of the confederation and responsible 
for the general administration of the country. This included, of course, the regulation 
of commerce and navigation of internal rivers. In the absence of an ordinary 
legislature, Urquiza also assumed legislative powers.  
 Thanks to the de facto control that provincial governors had over local elections, 
Urquiza was able to exert through them an enormous influence in the selection of 
delegates to the convention. According to some historical accounts, he indicated the 
names of half of the delegates that should be elected and approved the appointment 
of the other half (Rosa 1963: 37). Loyalty to the federal cause and even to Urquiza 
himself was an important criterion of selection. There were also intellectual and 
ideological considerations. Most delegates belonged to a generation of moderate and 
pragmatic liberals who shared the view of transforming Argentina into a modern 
constitutional state able to create political order and encourage economic progress. 
Given the priority of these considerations, many delegates were not in fact 
representative of provincial interests as such. An important number of delegates, for 
instance, did not belong to the province they were supposed to represent. Such was 
the case of Eduardo Lahitte and Salvador Maria del Carril, delegates from Buenos 
Aires in spite of the fact that neither was born in that province.5 
 In the eyes of most political actors in Buenos Aires, the whole process looked as 
a sheer imposition. The rules were set to create a constitution without consulting the 
opinion of the provinces in general, and Buenos Aires in particular. Moreover, 
Urquiza, obvious candidate to lead the executive of the future constitutional 
government, obtained enough means of influence to grant himself an extensive list of 
powers to force the adoption of the constitution.6 This situation, in addition to the 
absence of a requirement of popular ratification, predicted a constitution created 
under the exclusive influence of the future executive and his supporters. The 
constitution, in other words, would be born out of a pact between Urquiza and 
provincial governors. 
 In June, when the agreement was reviewed by the legislature of Buenos Aires, 
Mitre, one of the most influential leaders of the porteño political elite, argued against 
the agreement because it created in Urquiza an “irresponsible dictatorship.” 
                                                
5  In Buenos Aires these delegates received the pejorative term of  “alquilones” (rented people), that 
is, people rented to represent a province. See Rosa (1963: 16)  
6 Note that this suspicion was very well grounded. Not only was Urquiza the military protector of the 
assembly. He was even in charge of its material support. According to the Agreement, Urquiza 
himself was responsible of paying the stipend of the delegates and other expenditures related to the 
work of the assembly.  
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(Asambleas Constituyentes Argentinas 4: 314).7 In similar terms, but looking at the 
possible outcome of the future constituent assembly, deputy Velez Sarfield stated 
that the agreement was designed to make certain the election of Urquiza as president, 
perhaps with dictatorial power (Asambleas 4:314). While these criticisms were cast 
in personal terms, in fact, they revealed a more permanent dilemma of the leaders of 
Buenos Aires. Given the (at least, temporary) military advantage of the federalist 
coalition, Buenos Aires had to accept a federal state as the starting point of 
negotiations. Expecting to be a minority in the future government, however, the 
leaders of this province wanted to protect their interests from encroachments of the 
central government. Specifically, they had an incentive to oppose the creation of a 
strong executive power controlled by the provinces. 
 The legislature of Buenos Aires almost unanimously rejected the agreement 
arguing that it could not bind the province without its approval. As a response, 
Urquiza dissolved the legislature, assuming himself the role of de facto governor of 
Buenos Aires. On September 11, however, few days after he left Buenos Aires to 
open the sessions of the constituent assembly in Santa Fe, a rebellion exploded in the 
city. An anti-Urquiza coalition led by Valentín Alsina, supported by military leaders 
of the province of Buenos Aires, forced the resignation of Urquiza’s delegate, 
ratified the rejection of the agreement of San Nicolas, and revoked the powers of 
Lahitte and Del Carril to represent Buenos Aires at the convention. 
 Within the rebels there were, in fact, two dominant groups: a group of radicals, 
who wanted a complete separation of Buenos Aires from the future federation and a 
group of moderates, who would accept integration, but only under constitution-
making procedures more favorable to this province (Scobie 1964: 61). Each group, 
respectively known as “separatists” and “ nationalists”, had different views about the 
strategy that Buenos Aires should follow in the future. The first group, populated by 
former supporters of Rosas’ regime, thought that Buenos Aires should form an 
independent state even if that meant the risk of an open confrontation with the 
federalists. The second group, integrated by former unitarios (centralists) and a new 
generation of porteño politicians, considered that Buenos Aires should be part of the 
federation, but only if members of its political elite were allowed to have a 
substantial share in the future government (Saenz Quesada 1974: 42). In the 
meantime, however, both groups agreed in the need of forming a “negative” alliance 
to prevent the creation of a constitution according to the mechanisms designed by 
Urquiza.  
 The rebellion in Buenos Aires and the attempt of its new governor, Valentín 
Alsina, to invade Entre Ríos, delayed the inauguration of the constituent convention 
until November 20. The installation ceremony of the convention, however, shows 
that Urquiza had already decided that the new constitution would be created even 
without the participation of Buenos Aires. In the speech made for that occasion, he 
asserted that during the temporary absence of Buenos Aires, “the republic can and 
has all the necessary means to give itself a constitution” (Asambleas 4: 413).  
                                                
7 From now on, Asambleas. 
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 But why constitute a federation without Buenos Aires, if this province was so 
crucial for the economic viability of the new state? The integration of Buenos Aires 
at the time would have required either force or negotiation. Neither solution, 
however, was probably attractive for Urquiza. On the one hand, the use of direct 
military force could have had an enormous cost in terms of lives and resources, 
particularly given the widespread support that the rebellion seemed to enjoy in 
Buenos Aires. On the other hand, any negotiation with the rebels would require 
concessions that could put at risk the creation of a constitution favorable to 
provincial interests. A basic condition to negotiate with Buenos Aires would be to 
change the rules of procedure of the future convention, for instance, allowing 
Buenos Aires to appoint delegates according to population. But this would obviously 
increase the influence of Buenos Aires in the convention. 
 The decision to complete the constitution-making process without Buenos Aires 
presented instead some clear benefits, at least for the time being. In the first place, it 
would allow Urquiza to consolidate his leadership within the federalist coalition and 
isolate Buenos Aires from the rest of the provinces. Moreover, if the opening of 
littoral ports to international trade worked as expected, the federalist state could 
support itself without Buenos Aires and, eventually, impose the new constitution as 
the starting point of any future negotiation. In the same speech cited above, Urquiza 
stated his belief that the separation of Buenos Aires would only be a “temporary 
accident.” (Asambleas 4:413). That belief was confirmed when in early December a 
group of military leaders in the province of Buenos Aires demanded the resignation 
of governor Valentín Alsina and the participation of Buenos Aires in the convention. 
This event probably strengthened Urquiza’s decision to continue without Buenos 
Aires. The movement against the political elite of the city of Buenos Aires could 
help Urquiza to obtain his goal at a minimal cost. 
 On December 24, the constitutional assembly created the commission of 
constitutional affairs, the body that would centralize the preparation of the new 
constitution. It would be a small body, of only five members: Juan María Gutiérrez, 
Benjamín Gorostiaga, Manuel Leiva, Pedro Ferré and Díaz Colodrero. As it turned 
out, the first two, close to the intimate political circle of Urquiza, were responsible 
for the draft of the constitution, while the other three would simply review the 
project (Martire 1982; Sagarna 1938). On what basis would they work? 
 
  
3. The making of a presidential republic 
 
 Historical and comparative studies on constitution making show that 
constitutional choice, particularly at foundational moments, results from a complex 
interplay between impartial considerations and strategic conflicts. Following Jillson 
and Eubanks (1984) and Jillson (1988), however, it is possible to determine the 
relative importance of these factors differentiating between two different levels of 
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design, a "higher" level of basic options and a "lower" level of operational rules.8 
From this perspective, a mix of political ideology, historical experience, and 
impartial concerns for stability or efficiency shape the most general aspects of 
constitutional design. By contrast, in matters of detail and distributional issues the 
most important factors determining constitutional choice are the expectations of the 
actors about their future positions and the resources they have to make their 
preferences prevail.9 Typically, the option between monarchy or republic, 
presidentialism or parliamentarism, or even certain general characteristics of the 
design of the powers of different branches of government, corresponds to the level of 
decisions made according to ideology, experience, and impartial concerns. Rules of 
representation, electoral rules or questions clearly affecting the distribution of power 
between government and opposition are instead selected according to strategic 
interests. The making of a presidential republic in Argentina provides a good 
illustration of how these two levels of analysis complement each other to explain the 
final outcome of constitutional choice. 
The creation of a federal state and a relatively strong executive were predictable 
outcomes in a process dominated by provincial interests and the most likely leader of 
the future constitutional government. For most provincial leaders, the federation 
implied, at a minimum, the election of governors by the people of the provinces 
(rather than being appointed by the central government) along with the free 
navigation of internal rivers and the nationalization of external customhouses. It was 
also clear that the provinces attached to the federal idea some rule of equal 
representation in the national government to offset the influence of Buenos Aires. 
General Urquiza could also expect (although he did not make any explicit statement 
about this issue) some form of unipersonal executive with independent powers of 
government. This was, after all, the form of government adopted by provisional 
national authorities since 1820. 
In both respects, adopting the constitution of the American federalists could have 
been an expedient solution to the problem of constitutional design, particularly given 
the costs that an open a lengthy negotiation process could have implied for all the 
actors.10 Not only did this model enjoy a strong appeal among federalist leaders but 
it also offer a set of institutions that could reconcile the conflictive interests of the 
main political actors. Just as the presidential structure of government could serve 
Urquiza to consolidate his national leadership, a bicameral legislature with equal 
representation in a Senate and proportional representation of the states in the 
Chamber of Deputies could accommodate the interests of Buenos Aires with those of 
                                                
8 This construction builds on the work of Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and Ostrom (1979) who distinguish 
between a "constitutional" and an "operational" level of choice, one concerned with the choice of general 
institutional rules and the other with the preference for particular outcomes. Different from Jillson and 
Eubanks (1984), however, these authors do not consider that distributional issues may also  play a role at 
the constitutional level of choice. On the topic, see also Elster  (1991a,1991b,1995a,1995b,1995c).  
9 For a general, detailed analysis of the influence of these factors in constitution-making, see Negretto 
(2011; 2012).  
10 This was, for instance, the solution proposed by Domingo F. Sarmiento in 1850, before the defeat of 
Rosas. See Sarmiento ([1852] 1996: 116). See also the articles published by Muñoz (1852). 
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the least populated provinces.  
 The consolidation of political unity in Argentina, however, required tailor-made 
solutions to specific historical problems. One of these problems was the creation of a 
national authority in a context characterized by territorial fragmentation and 
pervasive factional conflict at the local level. Another -interrelated- problem was the 
overwhelming importance of a single state (Buenos Aires) and its likely resistance to 
be incorporated to the federation on an equal basis with the other provinces. These 
historical circumstances should be somehow reflected in the constitution at the time 
of designing the balance of power between the central government and local 
authorities and the scope of presidential authority. It was not apparent, however, 
what specific forms of institutional design could make feasible the consolidation of 
national authority in a way acceptable for all the parties involved. 
 Urquiza found a possible solution to this problem in a project of constitution 
sent to him on May 30 by Juan Bautista Alberdi, a liberal lawyer and intellectual 
exiled in Chile since the period of Rosas. The core of Alberdi’s proposal was based 
on the idea of a centralized federation, a presidential system with strong emergency 
powers and a broad regime of civil rights for both nationals and foreigners. On July 
22, Urquiza responded in a letter, later made public, in which he admitted that the 
book was “a very important means of cooperation” and that “it could not be written 
nor published in a better opportunity.” (Cárcano 1938: 6) From June to August of 
1852, the content of Alberdi’s book was widely publicized in the daily press of 
Buenos Aires and the interior of the country. In few months, the book turned into a 
best seller and Urquiza himself ordered a new national edition to distribute it in the 
provinces (Mayer 1963: 422). 
 By the end of August, Alberdi prepared a second edition of the book. 
Apparently following a recommendation made by Juan María Gutiérrez, Alberdi 
included in this edition a more detailed project to be used as a framework by the 
coming constituent convention (Pelliza 1923: 47).11 As an additional gesture of 
support, Urquiza sent Alberdi a new letter in November recognizing the importance 
of his project (Mayer 1969: 43). One month later, the constituent convention would 
use Alberdi’s project as a preliminary draft of the future constitution.  
 Just like his book in general, the project was widely commented by the press. At 
the time the book was published, no major opposition emerged about the basic tenets 
of the future constitution outlined by Alberdi. In fact, it is crucial to note that most of 
Alberdi’s central ideas were adopted by different proposals appeared at the time and 
that his views were generally accepted, even by those who would later become 
opponents of the new constitution. This shows that Alberdi´s project and its 
underlying political philosophy reflected more a shared understanding about the 
general traits of the future constitution than the isolated opinion of an intellectual or 
the short-term interest of a partisan actor. It is therefore necessary to analyze the 
content of this project in some detail to attempt an explanation of its influence.   
 
                                                
11 The title of Alberdi’s work was Bases y Puntos de Partida Para la Organización Nacional. The 
following references of this work will be based on the edition of Jorge Mayer (1969). Citations in the 
text will be made under the name of Bases, followed by chapter and page number. 
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3.1 The view of Alberdi 
  
 Liberalism is often defined as a political ideology emphasizing individual and 
minority rights and constitutional limits to state power. This definition, however, 
misrepresents the contributions of important liberal thinkers involved in the founding 
of new republics. In Spanish America, many liberal thinkers who drafted 
constitutions or participated in government functions were not so much concerned 
with the limitation as with the creation of state authority. This type of “state-
building” liberalism sought to strengthen the powers of the executive and the 
national government at the same time it opposed personal dictatorship and arbitrary 
government. Alberdi’s constitutional project is the best exponent of this thought.    
 The project of Alberdi followed the premise that the future constitution of 
Argentina should be neither a work of imitation nor a theoretical construction. It was 
his conviction that in order to last the constitution should be solidly grounded on 
historical experience. In this sense, Alberdi assumed that in post-Rosas Argentina 
the need to adopt some general institutions would not be disputed. After decades of 
conflict about the organization of the state, for instance, no major actor (nor even 
Buenos Aires) would question the need to adopt a federative model, at least not as a 
matter of principle. The parallel experience of civil war and dictatorship also 
prepared the ground to accept the creation of a strong national authority subject to 
the general limits of a constitutional state. The main problem, however, was how to 
formulate these institutions so that they could fit the particular historical conditions 
of Argentina and at the same time accommodate the still conflictive demands of the 
main political actors.   
 Alberdi thought that the new constitution should have an economic motive as its 
main objective.12 The prosperity of Buenos Aires notwithstanding, Argentina was 
still a backward country in which political conflicts often reflected a struggle for the 
distribution of scarce economic resources. While Buenos Aires could prosper thanks 
to the expansion of cattle production and the exclusive appropriation of the rents of 
its port, the rest of the country was either underdeveloped or limited in its capacity to 
grow. To solve this problem, he proposed a series of transformations that were part 
of the program of most liberal reformers of the time: free commerce, free navigation 
of internal rivers, removal of internal barriers to trade and the nationalization of all 
external customhouses.13 The final goal of these measures was to make of Buenos 
Aires a model of economic development for the whole country.  
 According to Alberdi, however, economic progress would not emerge from 
liberal economic measures alone. It was first necessary the elimination (or at least 
the contention) of the permanent state of anarchy that had affected Argentina since 
                                                
12 “This is the goal of our present day constitutions”, says Alberdi, “they must tend to organize and 
constitute the great practical means to take our liberated America from its current obscure and 
subordinated state,” in Bases (11: 220) 
13 See in particular arts. 8 to 11 of the project. In Bases, (38: 464). See also the similar proposals made 
by Sarmiento [1852] (1996: Ch. 4), and Mitre in the article “Profesión de Fé,”  published in Los 
Debates, April 1, 1852. 
   14 
    
 
1810. This required the construction of effective political power. Alberdi understood 
the relation between economic development and political conflict as one of mutual 
causality. Whereas political conflict had poverty and economic backwardness as its 
main cause, the latter could not be overcome without first achieving a minimum of 
political order. This Hobessian reasoning led Alberdi to look for a specific set of 
political institutions whose main purpose was the prevention of civil war and internal 
divisions. It was from this point of view that Alberdi proposed that the Argentine 
constitution should be, like the American one, federal and presidential. But different 
premises led him to fill these labels with institutions that would substantially depart 
from the design of American constitution-makers.14 
 Alberdi’s project created a double sphere of political authority. At the national 
level, power was divided between a president, a bicameral Congress and a Supreme 
Court, head of the federal judiciary. Governors, legislatures and provincial courts 
represented the local level of authority. Not really a federalist by conviction, Alberdi 
considered provincial autonomy as way of recognizing the power acquired by the 
governors. His project provided, then, for the right of the provinces to elect their 
own authorities and create their own institutions. It also guaranteed the provinces a 
sphere of equal representation in the Senate of a bicameral legislature with coequal 
powers of legislation. Different from the Chamber of Deputies, integrated by 
deputies elected by the people, this Senate would be integrated by two senators 
elected by each provincial legislature.   
 At the same time, however, Alberdi sought to restrict the sphere of provincial 
autonomy to a minimum. The central government, for instance, was invested with 
the power of “federal intervention” (intervención federal), which consisted of an 
authorization to take control of local governments (even without request from the 
province) in cases of sedition. In the same vein, the national Congress was invested 
with the power to review provincial constitutions before their approval, and the 
Supreme Court could decide on constitutional controversies between a province and 
the inhabitants of this province. These rules somewhat reversed the idea of 
federation that emerged from the American constitution. Rather than a union of 
independent states, delegating part of their sovereignty to the central government, 
Alberdi turned the idea of federation into the margin of authority that the central 
government was willing to recognize to the provinces (Botana 1983: 352).  
 One of Alberdi’s arguments in favor of this version of federalism was the almost 
opposite historical path followed by Argentina and the United States. North America 
went from a system of mutually independent states, during colonial times, to a single 
collective organization after independence. Argentina, like everywhere else in 
Spanish America, went from a system of unity to a system of independent (in fact, 
quasi-anarchic) states (Bases 25: 346-47). Moreover, the institutional conditions of 
local governments were completely different from one country to another. In this 
respect, Alberdi saw the situation of Argentina in 1852 closer to France in 1789 than 
to the United States in 1787. Whereas in the United States the colonies were already 
                                                
14 For a general comparison between the design of Alberdi and that of the American Federalists, 
particularly in relation to the presidentialist system, see Etchemendy (1997).   
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constituted before creating a national government, in Argentina, as in France, the 
regional units had no (or scarce) level of institutionalization. This is the reason why, 
in Alberdi’s view, the federal constitution should always precede and prevail over 
provincial constitutions.15 This is also the reason why he never thought of federalism 
as a limit to the power of the national government. Rather than part of a scheme of 
check and balances, provincial authorities were mere delegates of the central 
power.16 
 Apart from this general historical analysis, Alberdi’s idea of a “mixed” 
federation (part federal, part centralist) was also based on the model provided by 
predecessor institutions. The confederation under Rosas was such a model (Romero 
1963: 147). For all his hatred to Rosas’ arbitrariness, Alberdi deeply admired the fact 
that Rosas was the first leader since 1810 to create a truly national power. Such a 
power, Alberdi believed, should not be eliminated but institutionalized by means of a 
constitution.17 The secret of Rosas’ power was the reality of centralization behind 
the façade of an informal confederation. Given the weak institutional base of their 
local power and the permanent threat of invasion from other provinces, provincial 
caudillos were always forced to rely on the protection and resources provided by a 
stronger power. The superior military strength and economic power of Buenos Aires 
helped Rosas to play this protective role. He obtained obedience in exchange for 
protection.18 In the new constitution, Alberdi thought that something similar to this 
power was necessary to maintain order and political unity. A central government 
endowed with sufficient economic resources, a national army and legal instruments 
to control the provinces was probably its closest successor. 
 Following this line of reasoning, Alberdi proposed that the “efficient” secret of 
the new constitution should be found in the structure and powers of the presidency. 
“I would not doubt say”, Alberdi confessed, “that the fate of the states of South 
America especially depends on the constitution of the executive power” (Bases 26: 
351). In his view, the fall of the Spanish monarchy created a vacuum of power that a 
purely liberal republic with governments of limited powers and strong individual 
liberties could not fill. Latin American peoples, according to Alberdi, were 
unprepared for authentic republican rule. They lacked both the experience and the 
cultural predisposition to exercise political liberty within a minimum of order. 
Having neglected this reality was, in his opinion, the main mistake of early Latin 
                                                
15 See Alberdi’s footnote to article 7 of his project (revision of provincial constitutions by the national 
Congress). Bases (38: 463-64) 
16 This idea is indicated in article 107 of Alberdi’s project: “Provincial governors and public officials 
who depend on them, are natural agents of the general government, to obtain compliance with the 
constitution and the general laws of the confederation.” See Bases (38: 483) 
17 See Alberdi’s essay “La República Argentina, 37 Años Después de su Revolución de Mayo,” in 
Obras Completas (1886: 221-242). See also “Compromisos y Deberes en que el Gobierno Absolutista 
de Buenos Aires se Halla de Seguir el Movimiento Político de Europa de Este Momento,” and 
“Importancia que para Chile tienen los Asuntos de Buenos Aires”. These articles are reproduced in 
Barros (1997). 
18 Even without explaining the mechanisms of Rosas’ authority, Alberdi frequently cites the ability of 
Rosas to obtain obedience as one of the main, albeit unintended, contributions of his rule to the 
purpose of national unity. See in particular, Bases, Chap. 29. 
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American liberals. They wanted to create a political order based on the doctrine of 
popular sovereignty, with weak executives and extensive individual guarantees. But 
they woke up, he thinks, in midst of anarchy and disorder. Until the habits and ideas 
of Latin Americans change through the salutary effect of economic and cultural 
progress, there is only one possible form of free government that is compatible with 
order: a republic of “Kings with the name of presidents” (Bases 13: 229).  
 In Alberdi’s own view, it was in the area of presidential powers where his 
project more radically departed from the American precedent (Bases 26: 349). The 
role of the president in the American constitution was a key element of Madison’ s 
interpretation of the separation of powers as a system where each department of 
government should have the means and the motives to preserve its own powers and 
prevent encroachments by others.19 In this view, the specific means to avert 
usurpation was to provide each department of government with a partial share in the 
function of others so that they would be subject to a system of mutual checks and 
balances. The American president, for instance, was thought to prevent the 
expansion of legislative power (the branch more prone to power abuse, according to 
the framers) by means of his veto power over legislation. In order to make this 
control effective, the president was made independent from the legislature by means 
of his separate election, his fixed duration in office, the possibility of re-election and 
his powers over government formation. The power of the president, however, was in 
turn limited by his dependence on Congress to pass most legislation, to approve the 
budget or, in the case of the Senate, to have its approval to appoint members of his 
cabinet or federal judges. The president could only veto a bill as a whole and his 
veto was subject to a two-third majority override in the legislature. He had no legal 
power to act on his own in cases of emergency and was subject to impeachment in 
cases of violation of the constitution.  
 Alberdi saw the separation of powers as an essential ingredient of a liberal 
constitution and accepted the view that certain elements of the doctrine of checks 
and balances were necessary to prevent abuse and concentration of power. In his 
project, for instance, the roles of president and Congress would remain separate and 
balanced regarding legislation. While the president was entitled to introduce 
legislation, he was dependent on Congress for its final approval. Just like the 
American president, his only means of influence was a veto subject to a two-thirds 
majority override in the legislature.20 Also similar to the design of the American 
constitution, while an Electoral College elected the president for a fixed term, he was 
subject to impeachment in Congress in cases of misconduct or violation of the 
constitution. Different from the American president, Alberdi’s president did not 
require the consent of the Senate to appoint cabinet ministers, something that 
                                                
19 See Madison’s Federalist 47 to 51, in Madison, Hamilton and Jay [1788] (1987: 302-22) 
20 In Alberdi’s project as well as in the final text of the constitution, the president was authorized to 
veto the totality as well as parts of a bill. This authorization, however, did not invest the president with 
the power to promulgate the non-observed parts of a bill. The whole project had to be sent back to 
Congress and it was up to the assembly to decide whether to approve the veto or insist in the original 
bill.  
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provided him with greater autonomy in terms of government formation.21 However, 
following the logic of checks and balances, his power to appoint federal judges, 
including members of the Supreme Court, was subject to that requirement.  
 In spite of these provisions, Alberdi rejected one of the central assumptions of 
the doctrine of check and balances: the idea that constitutional stability should be the 
product of a self-enforcing equilibrium among the different branches of government. 
(Manin 1995). In his view, in countries without constitutionalist tradition and 
affected by permanent conflicts among factions, the enforcement of the constitution 
depended on the existence of a strong executive power able to act with discretion in 
exceptional circumstances. It was in this sense that Alberdi seemed to believe (citing 
Juan Egaña, the intellectual forerunner of the Chilean constitution) that “it is an 
illusion the equilibrium of powers.” (Bases 26: 354). For Alberdi, when the 
constitution is in danger, the president is the only force able to prevent anarchy and 
dissolution. Individual guarantees, Alberdi wrote, would become vain words without 
the existence of public guarantees, the first of which is “the government, the 
executive power with capacity to make peace and constitutional order effective…” 
(Bases 26: 353). 
 This view was translated in the design of emergency powers. The project 
introduced the institution of the state of siege, the temporary suspension of 
individual guarantees that the president could declare in cases of external attack or 
internal disorder. Consent of the Senate was required in cases of external attack and 
approval of the whole Congress in cases of internal disorder. The president, 
however, could act alone in the event that Congress were not in session and had no 
obligation to convoke the Congress to extraordinary sessions. To see the ample 
residual power that this rule provided to the president one must consider additional 
provisions of Alberdi’s project, like the one establishing that Congress would remain 
in sessions for only five months a year, a period that only the president could 
extend.22 This provision meant that, most of the time, the president would exercise 
emergency powers free from legislative control. The short duration of congressional 
sessions and the lack of power of Congress to extend them also had an impact in 
areas related to emergency powers, like the institution of federal intervention. 
Although the project established that federal interventions should be declared by the 
national government, the short duration of congressional sessions also meant that, in 
practice, the power of federal intervention would largely remain in hands of the 
president. 
 Alberdi formed his beliefs about the benefits of this design during his exile in 
Chile. Since the early 1830s, the Conservative Party in Chile created a political 
                                                
21 One should observe, however, that given the power of the president to dismiss cabinet ministers at 
will, congressional consent for appointment, while a clear restriction, is not a powerful form of 
legislative control. Except in some exceptional circumstances, the Senate would not block a 
presidential appointment knowing that, in the end, the permanence of cabinet ministers in office is 
dependent on the confidence of the president. The situation is different with the appointment of judges 
with life tenure. Since neither the president nor Congress can dismiss judges for political reasons, the 
senators have an incentive to make a more strict supervision of presidential nominees to the courts. 
22 He discarded, then, the solution (adopted by the American constitution) of giving Congress the 
power to determine the extension of its sessions. 
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regime that, in contrast to the experience of most Latin American countries at the 
time, managed to secure a high degree of political stability, order, and economic 
progress (Collier 1985: 583). Alberdi attributed this success to the conservative 
constitution of 1833 and the extensive powers it provided to the president, 
particularly in the area of emergency powers.23 Other Argentine liberals exiled in 
Chile during the 40s shared this idea. Similar to Alberdi, for instance, Sarmiento 
used to scorn as “doctrinaire” the claims of those Chilean liberals who criticized the 
conservative constitution for the excessive predominance it gave to the president in 
the political process. Although partisans of a government with legally defined 
powers, both Sarmiento and Alberdi believed that only a president with strong 
powers could prevent anarchy in countries without tradition of representative 
government and plagued by internal conflict.24 Despotism should be avoided, of 
course, but not by means of weakening state authority.   
 Two more elements of Alberdi’s design should be mentioned for their 
importance: the role of elections and the duration of representatives in office. The 
precedent of Rosas, with his use of popular vote to legitimize dictatorial rule, 
convinced Alberdi as well as many other liberals of his generation of the need to 
restrict popular sovereignty at its base, with literacy and property qualifications.25 
The much-admired stability of the Chilean constitution of 1833, which adopted that 
solution, reinforced this belief. In spite of this opinion, however, Alberdi preferred to 
leave the regulation of elections for senators and representatives to each province, 
probably assuming that provincial constitutions and electoral laws were the adequate 
instruments to establish voting qualifications.26 The project did include restrictions 
to the direct expression of popular will, like the election of the president by an 
electoral college or the election of senators by local legislatures, both taken from the 
American constitution. There were also restrictions to be elected, absent in the 
American model, like explicit property qualifications for senators, representatives 
and presidents.  
 With respect to the duration in office, Alberdi’s project included a rule that 
became typical of many Latin American constitutions of the second half of the XIX 
century: the proscription of presidential re-election for two consecutive terms. 
Whereas senators and representatives could be re-elected, the project granted the 
                                                
23 See Bases (26: 354) and footnote to article 85, par. 22 of the project (state of siege), in Bases (38: 
479). See also the articles published by Alberdi in El Comercio de Valparaiso: “Exige Reforma la 
Actual Constitución de Chile?” (06-14-48), “Compromisos y Deberes en que el Gobierno Absolutista 
de Buenos Aires se Halla de Seguir el Movimiento Político de Europa de este Momento” (07-3-48),  
“La Democracia en Sudamérica” 07-4-48), “Notable Diferencia entre los Agitadores y Conservadores 
de las Repúblicas, y los de las Monarquías” (08-22-48), and “Chile y Buenos Aires Comparados por la 
Reforma”(08-30-48). See Barros (1997) 
24 See, for instance, the articles published by Sarmiento in El Progreso between 1844 and 1845, 
reproduced under the title of “Representación Nacional,” in Obras Completas ([1886] 1909: vol. IX) 
25 Aversion to popular sovereignty and the idea of representative government as the rule “of reason”, 
that is, of an enlightened minority, was a popular theme among the new generation of liberals formed 
during the years of Rosas’ rules (the so called the “37s Generation”). Alberdi’s mentor, Esteban 
Echeverria was one of the main exponents of this view. It was also the position of Sarmiento and most 
exiles in the 40s. See Romero (1963: 145) 
26 See Bases (Ch. 13) and article 45 of the project.   
   19 
    
 
president this possibility only after one term out of office. This type of provision has 
generally been portrayed as a safeguard against presidential despotism.27 Following 
Alexander Hamilton, however, one could very well argue that, being an inducement 
to good behavior, it is the possibility of re-election (not its proscription) what should 
work as a check on the executive.28 Alberdi certainly knew this position.29 However, 
he was not so much concerned with the limitation of presidential power as with the 
perpetuation of the president in office. The president, he said, “always has the means 
to make himself re-elected and he would rarely fail to do so.”30 Because of this, 
Alberdi preferred a presidency of 6 years without re-election to a shorter one (say, of 
4 or 5 years) with that possibility. The most likely reason for this option was the 
need to grant some measure of rotation in office in a situation where a strong 
president would certainly use his various means of influence, formal and informal, to 
get himself re-elected. That was the case of Chile until the early 1870s, in which 
presidents with control over the electoral machinery always served for two terms.   
 As I noted before, the general aspects of this institutional design reflected 
widely shared views and impartial concerns about the political institutions that 
would best fit the particular historical conditions of Argentina. Alberdi wrote as the 
spokesman of a conservative version of liberalism that became predominant in mid 
XIX century Argentina. At the same time, however, the project had a practical 
political dimension: it was intended to work as a compromise among the conflicting 
interests of three different actors: the future president, provincial governors and the 
leaders of Buenos Aires. As he put it, “the constitution is a political pact dictated by 
the need to reconcile facts, interests and demands of the circumstances.” (Bases 30: 
401). It is in this respect that Alberdi´s model eventually became part of a complex 
bargaining process in which short-term political interests and strategic resources 
played a predominant role in shaping the final design of the constitution.  
 It seems clear why Urquiza, the obvious candidate for president under the new 
constitution, gave Alberdi’s project such an enthusiastic support. From a strategic 
point of view, a presidency with strong powers to suspend constitutional guarantees 
or take control of local governments in cases of internal conflict was instrumental to 
prevent challenges to the central authority or avert internal disputes within the 
federalist coalition. As Urquiza knew very well, the previous failure of the federalist 
project was not simply due to the hegemony of Buenos Aires. Regional economic 
and political rivalries also created problems of coordination among provincial 
leaders for the formation of a stable federalist coalition. Now that this coalition was 
in place thanks to his leadership, it was crucial for Urquiza to have the capacity to 
prevent defections and counteract internal rebellions within it. In this respect, the 
instrument of federal intervention would give the president a powerful and 
potentially credible threat in order to induce discipline and collaboration among 
                                                
27 See, for instance,  Kantor (1971)  
28 See Hamilton, Alexander in “Federalist No 72,” in Madison, Hamilton and Jay [1788] (1987: 413-
14)  
29  It was also formulated during the debates of the frustrated constitution of 1826. See Asambleas (3: 
1159)  
30 See Bases (38:475)  footnote to article 79, p. 475. 
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provincial leaders. The armed resistance of Buenos Aires to the constitution, of 
course, could only add an additional motive for an institutional design similar to 
Alberdi’s.31 
 More intriguing, however, is why would provincial leaders agree to an 
institutional design that gave the provinces such restricted political autonomy and 
provided the president with so important powers. To put it differently, why do 
Argentine federalists, after decades of struggle against centralism, would accept a 
system that gives so much power to the central government in general and the 
president in particular? The answer, I believe, resides in the internal dynamics of the 
federal coalition itself. While Urquiza was dependent on the support of the 
governors, he also had some leverage to induce the members of his coalition to 
sacrifice or moderate some demands. As organizer and representative of the 
federalist coalition, Urquiza knew he was providing his supporters with benefits that 
none of them could achieve on their own or, for the moment, in alliance with other 
parties. These benefits were clearly a constitution that would preserve local 
elections, nationalize external customhouses and open internal rivers to international 
trade. In exchange for the recognition of their respective spheres of influence and a 
share in the distribution of national economic resources, Urquiza could obtain from 
provincial leaders the acceptance of certain restrictions to local autonomy that, from 
his point of view, were necessary to consolidate his national authority. 32  
 One should also note that provincial leaders did not necessarily see certain 
restrictions to local autonomy, such as the power of federal intervention, as in 
conflict with their fundamental political interests. Since their power was constantly 
challenged by internal and external competitors, the president could use the 
mechanism of federal intervention to help them to remain in power, at least as long 
as the president was also dependent on those provincial leaders to govern. A similar 
type of exchange, after all, cemented the relative stability of the confederate system 
under Rosas. The constitutional design proposed by Alberdi also provided provincial 
leaders with several safeguards that could be used to check and control the power of 
the executive. The election of the president, for instance, depended on electors from 
the provinces (in a number equal to the deputies and senators each province sent to 
Congress). Given the de facto control that provincial governors had over local 
elections, this rule meant that any president would have to obtain their approval (at 
least of a majority of them) in order to be elected. Due to the principles of separation 
                                                
31 In fact, the correspondence between the political interests of Urquiza at the time and Alberdi’s 
design of presidential powers was so close that some historians saw in the model “more a constitution 
for the vanquisher of Rosas than for the Argentine Nation.” See Pelliza (1923: 92). This claim may be 
exaggerated. As we saw, Alberdi’s conception of the executive power was primarily based on his 
beliefs about the cultural and social conditions of Latin American countries, the success of the Chilean 
constitution and the need to create some continuity with predecessor institutions. However, the fact 
that the model of a strongly presidentialist republic was also instrumental to realize the interests of 
Urquiza tell us something about the relation between ideas and interests in political life. Although 
ideas may and do often emerge independently from interests, they rarely become influential without 
the support of dominant actors who find in those ideas a good translation of their interests. 
32 For the analysis of Alberdi’s design as a system of trade-offs between Urquiza and provincial 
leaders, see Tonelli, (1995).  
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and balance between president and Congress in the area of legislation, provincial 
leaders could also rely on the idea that they would control the levels of presidential 
support in the legislature, particularly in the Senate. The Senate had important 
legislative powers, provided approval for the state of siege, participated in the 
appointment of federal judges and, according to the project, had even the exclusive 
right to propose amendments to the constitution.  
 Following this analysis, it seems apparent that Alberdi’s project could not be the 
basis of an acceptable negotiated agreement for Buenos Aires. This province would 
lose its economic monopoly and political advantages without obtaining any 
substantial concessions in exchange. Not only the rents of the port would be 
nationalized but also the city of Buenos Aires would be declared capital of the 
Republic. The majority in Congress, both in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies 
would be in hands of provincial interests, and the Presidency, with its strong 
emergency powers and powers of intervention, controlled by the leader of this 
majority. A simple evaluation of their future position under the new constitution, 
would confirm for the leaders of Buenos Aires their initial decision to resist the 
integration of the province under these terms. 
  
 3. 2 The view of the delegates 
  
 A complete explanation for the adoption of Alberdi’s model as well as of the 
reforms introduced to this project in the final design would require a thorough 
examination of the actual positions of the delegates in the debates of the convention. 
Documentary evidence about the debates is unfortunately fragmented and 
incomplete. There are no records of the work of the commission of constitutional 
affairs that elaborated the draft and only few complete reproductions of the debates 
in plenary sessions. Scarce as it is, however, the evidence available is enough to 
argue that the majority of delegates did not adopt Alberdi’s design as a mere matter 
of expediency, given the lack of alternative projects. Fragments of recorded debates 
as well as the events surrounding the work of the assembly suggest that most of the 
delegates shared the idea that Alberdi´s project provided the best set of institutions 
not only for the country but also for the strategic context under which the 
constitution was being made. 
 Benjamín Gorostiaga prepared the official project of constitution with the 
collaboration of Juan María Gutiérrez, both representatives of the views of the 
liberal majority at the convention and strong supporters of Urquiza. Their project 
confirmed the main elements of Alberdi’s design. 33 The project proclaimed the free 
navigation of internal rivers, the elimination of internal barriers to trade and the 
nationalization of the rents of all external customhouses. It also declared the city of 
Buenos Aires capital of the Republic. However, as a compensation for the separation 
of the city from the province, the project provided that the city of Buenos Aires 
                                                
33 Apart from Alberdi’s project, other sources of the constitution included the centralist constitution of 
1826 and the American constitution of 1787 and the Cádiz constitution of 1812. See Bacque (1915: 
141-43). See also Vanossi (1976).  
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would be entitled to elect deputies for the Chamber of Deputies and senators for the 
Senate.  
 Regarding the distribution of powers between the central government and the 
provinces, the project reproduced the model of a centralized federation advocated by 
Alberdi. In this sense, the central government maintained the power to intervene in 
the provinces, even without request of local authorities, and the Congress preserved 
the right to revise provincial constitutions. It is interesting to note, however, that the 
project of the commission invested the central government with even stronger 
powers than Alberdi’s. The federal judiciary, for instance, was in charge of a new 
form of centralized control: the power to decide in conflicts between different 
branches of provincial governments.    
 Just like in Alberdi’s model, the different branches of government were 
separated and elements of mutual checks were introduced to secure the balance of 
executive-legislative relations. Regarding the legislative process, just like in 
Alberdi’s project, the president could only participate in it by means of his authority 
to initiate laws and exercise a veto subject to a two-thirds majority override.  
 The prerogative power of the president, however, was visibly enhanced in the 
project of the commission. Whereas in Alberdi’s project the president could not 
declare the state of siege by himself when the Congress was in session, the project of 
the commission allowed him to bypass congressional authorization altogether in 
cases of extreme urgency. At the same time, a general provision was included 
authorizing the president to act by himself in all cases where the consent of the 
Senate was required but the Congress was not in session. In combination to the short 
duration of congressional sessions, these new rules clearly increased the residual 
powers of the president to act in unforeseen circumstances. Perhaps the only partial 
exception to this accentuation of presidential powers was the inclusion of the right of 
Congress to request reports to cabinet ministers and the proscription of delegation of 
legislative powers to the president.  
 The general scheme for the election of representatives and duration in office 
recommended by Alberdi was maintained.34 Apparently, however, the framers did 
not share with Alberdi his same preventions against universal suffrage. According to 
the new constitution, the law of elections would be regulated by the national 
government, not by the provinces. The first national Congress enacted this law in 
1857, which established universal male suffrage. Moreover, the national Congress 
rejected local constitutions when the latter attempted to impose voting qualifications 
(Cantón 1973: 20).  
 Although the project was ready for discussion by mid February, it was not 
submitted to plenary sessions until April. One obstacle was the emergence of 
internal conflict in the commission of constitutional affairs. While the project 
prepared by Gorostiaga and Gutiérrez synthesized the existing consensus among the 
liberal majority, members of the conservative minority at the convention (Colodrero, 
                                                
34 We should note, however, two variants. On the one hand, the property qualifications to be elected 
deputy were removed while those required for president increased. On the other hand, the duration of 
senators in office was extended from 6 to 9 years, apparently to make this body a more conservative 
element in the system of government. 
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Ferré and Leiva) controlled the commission itself. This group opposed the liberals in 
a few but important aspects such as the location of the capital in Buenos Aires, the 
elimination of internal barriers to trade, and above all, the issue of religious 
tolerance.35 In order to remove this obstacle, on February 23, two new members, 
Derqui and Zapata, were added to the commission and Ferré, then participating in 
the negotiations with Buenos Aires, was replaced by Zavalia (Martire 1982: 8-10). 
Even after these changes, however, the dynamics of the conflict with Buenos Aires 
made impossible the discussion of the project.  
 In spite of the siege, Buenos Aires showed an extraordinary capacity to resist 
thanks to its advantageous economic position. In January, the convention authorized 
Urquiza to use any necessary means to cease the conflict, implicitly including force 
(Scobie 1964: 81). Urquiza, however, decided to send a delegation to negotiate with 
Buenos Aires, perhaps expecting that the persistence of the conflict and the threat to 
use force in case of a failure to reach an agreement would convince the city to make 
concessions. Delegates of Urquiza reached a compromise on March 9 but its terms 
were completely unacceptable for the federalist leader: Buenos Aires required the 
appointment of delegates according to population and the limitation of Urquiza’s 
powers to the conduction of foreign affairs (Scobie 1964: 84).  
 With the suspension of negotiations in March, further delays were unnecessary 
and, in fact, there seemed to be an extreme urgency to approve the constitution as 
soon as possible. The project was finally presented on April 18 and the discussion in 
particular took place between the 21st and 31st of the same moth, that is, in only 10 
days. A record in celerity, the average time of discussion for each article was 11 
minutes and 30 seconds.36 In spite of the brevity of discussions, it is possible to 
reconstruct some of the motivations that led the framers to the particular design of 
executive powers and the distribution of power between the central government and 
the provinces.  
 Most of the arguments on behalf of a vigorous executive authority were cast in 
terms of the belief that the greatest evil in Argentina was not so much the abuse of 
power by the government as the absence of an effective power to consolidate 
national unity. Just like Alberdi, most delegates in the convention seemed to 
perceive that only a strong power, capable of counteracting the political instability 
and extreme localism of the provinces, could save the country from anarchy. During 
the discussion of the Agreement of San Nicolás in the legislature of Buenos Aires, 
Juan Maria Gutiérrez, then minister of government of that province, defended the 
need of a strong executive authority against the argument that the Agreement was 
creating in Urquiza a despotic power. “All our evils,” said Gutiérrez in response to 
Mitre, “come from the absence of a power, a force to tie up and give consistency to 
                                                
35 From an average of 18 members that were present in the convention at the time of initiating the 
discussion of the project, around 10 were part of the liberal group that included leading figures such as 
Del Carril, Gorostiaga, Gutiérrez, Zavalía, and Seguí. The conservative group was composed of 6 
delegates: Ferré, Diaz Colodrero, Zuviría, Perez, Zenteno, and Leiva. In the jargon of the assembly the 
first group was called “círculo” and the latter “montonera.” See Rosa (1963: 364). 
36 The calculus was made by Rosa (1963: 374). 
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otherwise separated elements.” (Asambleas 4:322). All those who defended the 
powers granted to Urquiza by the Agreement made similar arguments.37 
 Although impartial considerations were certainly involved in these views, it 
seems clear that the proposal of an executive invested with strong emergency powers 
was also based on a concrete political evaluation of the strategic context faced by 
Urquiza and the federalist coalition. Between May and August of 1852 alone three 
provincial governments were replaced by local revolts.38 In this context, the rebels of 
Buenos Aires could easily frustrate the creation of the federal constitution by 
exploiting internal conflicts among provincial leaders. This fear was not 
preposterous. The province of Corrientes itself, located in the heart of Urquiza’s area 
of influence, provided support to a frustrated attempt of Buenos Aires to overthrow 
Urquiza in October of 1852 (Minutolo 1985).  
 We can perceive the presence of these concerns in the debate over the 
opportunity to approve the constitution while Buenos Aires was separated and on the 
verge of war with the federalists. On April 20, Zuviria, president of the convention 
and opponent of the institutional and political views of Urquiza´s supporters, argued 
for the convenience of suspending the approval of the constitution until peace 
between Buenos Aires and the federation was achieved. He presented a paradox: 
either the constitution would create a power so limited as being unable to restore 
order or so strong as to put at risk the very existence of a constitutional government 
of limited powers. By presenting this second alternative, Zuviria was clearly warning 
the delegates that they might be designing the powers of the president with an 
exclusive short-term concern, namely, the incorporation of Buenos Aires in terms 
favorable to the federalists.  
 Against Zuviria’s opinion that the new constitution would be impotent to 
resolve the crisis in Buenos Aires, delegate Zavalía stated that the best guarantee of 
order in the country is that “the constitution creates a treasury, an army, and above 
all, a Supreme Magistrate invested with detailed legal powers.” (Asambleas 4: 481)39 
Similarly, delegate Huergo said that in his opinion the constitution was the only 
efficient means to bring peace to the country. The Argentine Republic, he argued 
citing Alberdi, “needs a strong and vigorous government, but a government born out 
of the constitution.” (Asambleas 4: 483). Segui, finally, argued that the current 
rebellion of Buenos Aires made even more compelling the need to create the 
constitution to make, “if not impossible, at least more difficult the reproduction of 
similar events.” (Asambleas 4: 486). 
 One should note, however, that different from the arguments in favor of strong 
executive powers, some the arguments made in support of centralist institutions 
within the federal state seemed even less directly related to short-term partisan 
                                                
37 See, in particular, the speech of Vicente Fidel Lopez. He argued, for instance, that the desire to 
organize the country since 1810 “never failed due to dictatorship but to anarchy”. He further specified 
that by anarchy he meant  the predominance of local interests and provincialism over the collective 
good. See, Asambleas (Vol. 4, pp. 375-381)   
38 In two of these cases Urquiza used his personal influence to restore the previous governments. His 
intention was to avoid the spread of similar revolts. See Scobie (1964: 51) 
39 [my emphasis]. 
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motivations. In a frequently cited statement, delegate Gutiérrez said on the session of 
April 20 that the United States provided the model of federal state that the 
constitution was about to create.40 As we know, however, this model was adapted in 
significant ways, particularly in reference to the relatively high degree of 
centralization of power in the federal government. Adaptations such as the 
emergency powers and powers of federal intervention in hands of the president, 
certainly derived from the immediate interest in breaking the resistance of Buenos 
Aires. There were, however, more long-term concerns involved in other aspects of 
the centralist character of the future constitution, as one can conclude from the 
debate that led to the inclusion of provincial governors among the authorities that 
could be impeached by the national legislature. 
 On the session of April 26, Regis Martinez, delegate from La Rioja, suggested 
the inclusion of provincial governors among the officials that the Chamber of 
Deputies had the right to impeach. Alluding to the extreme personalization of power 
in the provinces, Martinez justified the addition arguing that it would be absurd to 
expect the impeachment of these governors by provincial legislatures. The majority 
of the members of these bodies, in his view, were either paid by the governor or 
under his influence (Asambleas 4: 520). Coming from a delegate that was supposed 
to represent state interests, this proposal shows an important degree of independence, 
particularly from the governors.  
 The proposal of delegate Martinez received the support of Zavalia, member of 
the commission of constitutional affairs. He argued that the impeachment of 
governors by Congress, like the right of federal intervention or the revision of 
provincial constitutions by Congress, fitted the model of a centralized federation, the 
only feasible federation in a country like Argentina, without republican traditions 
(Asambleas 4: 522). In spite of the opposition of Gorostiaga, the arguments of 
Zavalia in support of the provision decided the vote of the majority. On April 30, 
using arguments similar to Martinez and Zavalía, delegate Zenteno suggested that 
the lack of judicial independence in the provinces would justify the inclusion of 
conflicts between a provincial governor and a citizen within federal jurisdiction. This 
proposal, however, was defeated on the grounds that it would imply an excessive 
form of intrusion of the central government on local affairs. 
 Part of the reason for the celerity of the discussions, or even lack of debate in 
some cases, was the absence of strong divisions in the assembly. Few additions or 
corrections were made to the original project and many articles, particularly those 
related to the structure and division of powers, were approved by unanimity. As 
mentioned before, some cleavages existed between a conservative minority and a 
liberal majority. The minority, for instance, expressed disagreement about making 
Buenos Aires capital of the republic, the abolition of internal customhouses between 
the provinces, and very specially, to the issue of religious tolerance. The opposition, 
however, never threatened the stability of the assembly in spite of the fact that the 
                                                
40 More exactly, he said that the American federation was “the only federation of the world that 
deserves to be imitated”. See Asambleas (Vol.4: 479). 
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only concession they obtained from the majority was the requirement that the 
president must be catholic.  
 Another reason for the celerity of the sessions was the seeming agreement 
within the majority to avoid long debates. 41 Probably by decision of Urquiza, the 
constitution had to be approved on May 1.42 This decision makes sense in the 
context of the conflict with Buenos Aires. The race to approve the new constitution 
started few days after Urquiza abandoned the pretension to induce Buenos Aires to 
negotiate. In effect, by mid April Urquiza decided to take direct participation in the 
siege of the city of Buenos Aires that the rebels in the province of Buenos Aires 
were sustaining since the beginning of December (Scobie 1964: 86). In that context, 
the rapid approval of the new constitution was intended to signal the leaders of the 
city that, from then on, they would have to accept the constitution in the form it was 
approved or suffer an indefinite siege that could very well end in the direct use of 
force. 
By May 1, then, the main task was concluded. A federation was finally formed 
and Urquiza, the obvious candidate for president, would now receive permanent 
legal powers to maintain the support of the provinces and force Buenos Aires to 
accept the new constitution as a fait accompli. To make more credible the 
commitment to impose the new constitution, the constitution-makers of 1853 
included a provision according to which no reforms could be made before passing 
ten years. But in this respect, at least, the leaders of the federal republic would prove 
to be wrong.  
 
 
4. The incomplete constitution: the federation between 1853 and 1860 
 
 By the time the constitution was approved, there was no evidence that Buenos 
Aires would abandon its resistance. The resources that the port-city managed to obtain 
to resist the siege were significantly higher than those that Urquiza and the rebels of 
the province of Buenos Aires were able to collect together. In June, the failure of a 
blockade to the port of Buenos Aires led the siege toward a dead end.  Without more 
resources to maintain his own forces, in July of 1853, Urquiza accepted a mediation to 
put an end to the siege.   
 From that date until 1860, the federation of thirteen provinces and Buenos Aires 
would de facto organize as separate states. This, however, only meant a temporary 
suspension of negotiations during which both sides would struggle to induce the other 
to back down from their respective positions. From the point of view of the leaders of 
Buenos Aires, at least for those who rejected the possibility of creating an independent 
state, the acceptance of a federal state was an inevitable element of any possible 
agreement. So was the acceptance of a relatively strong presidential office. They 
hoped, however, to introduce certain changes so that the new institutions would be less 
                                                
41 Santiago Baque makes this observation for the session of April 21, when the delegates were 
discussing the convenience of declaring Buenos Aires capital of the federation. I think, however, that 
this observation is also valid for the rest of the sessions. See Baque (1915: 153). 
42 May 1 was the second anniversary of the Urquiza’s manifesto against Rosas. 
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damaging to their political and economic interests. Porteño leaders expected, for 
instance, concessions in the design of rules of representation to give this province 
more weight in the making of national decisions, the resignation of Urquiza as 
president and/or the moderation of some of his “dictatorial” powers.  
 
 4.1 Between bargaining and force 
  
 With Urquiza concentrated in building the new federal state, the different groups 
that dominated the political situation in Buenos Aires tried to debilitate the position of 
the federalists by using different strategies. The most radical group (the “separatists”), 
which gained control of the province after 1853 intended to signal the federalists that 
Buenos Aires had the capacity and the disposition to create a sovereign state and resist 
by force its integration. It is significant, however, that they avoided a formal 
declaration of independence that would have certainly caused a new war between 
Buenos Aires and the federalists.43 Moderates (or “nationalists”), instead, wanted to 
make clear that the de facto independence of Buenos Aires was simply a temporary 
situation, a suspension rather than a complete breakdown of negotiations. Both groups, 
however, relied on the ability of Buenos Aires to sustain itself during the secession 
and hoped that in the absence of sufficient revenues, the federalists would be forced to 
make some important concessions. In other words, even if the constitution of a totally 
independent state was impossible in the long run, Buenos Aires had a clear capacity to 
wait for better conditions of negotiation than those imposed by Urquiza and his 
supporters in the provinces. In the meantime, the leaders of Buenos Aires would 
attempt to break the current majoritarian coalition by creating or exploiting divisions 
in it, eventually making alliances with potential defectors.  
 The strategy of Urquiza, in turn, had three main components. In the first place, he 
sought to isolate Buenos Aires from the rest of the provinces. The goal was to 
eliminate any possible form of influence of Buenos Aires in the provinces. The 
success of this move, of course, depended on the previous unification of the thirteen 
provinces under Urquiza’s leadership. Apart from his personal influence, Urquiza tried 
to achieve this goal by resorting to his new institutional powers. As expected, the 
power of federal intervention and the state of siege were crucial instruments in this 
task. Between 1853 and 1858 the national executive took direct political control of 
several provinces affected by internal turmoil, such as La Rioja, Santa Fe, Jujuy and 
San Juan. Some other provinces, like Corrientes, were declared under state of siege 
(Pelliza 1923: 199-201; Scobie 1964: 107-112). In all these cases, the president used 
these constitutional powers to contain internal struggles within the federation or 
prevent challenges against his own authority. 
 A second, crucial move was to increase the capacity of the federation to survive 
without Buenos Aires. The economic dependence of the federation on Buenos Aires 
could only be overcome by eliminating the monopoly of its port over international 
trade. The first step in this direction was originally taken by a decree of August of 
                                                
43 While in 1854 a constituent convention dominated by radicals created a new constitution for 
Buenos Aires, it left undefined the exact political status of this province. See Scobie (1964: 165) 
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1852, by which Urquiza established the free navigation of internal rivers and opened 
the ports of the littoral provinces to the free commerce with foreign nations. This was 
one the main motivations behind the war against Rosas and a key aspect of the new 
constitution. In fact, so much hope was placed on the economic benefits of the free 
navigation of internal rivers that some people, like Alberdi himself, thought that if the 
strategy was successful, the federation could very well do without Buenos Aires.44   
 A final element to induce Buenos Aires to accept the federal constitution was 
making credible the threat to use force in case of intransigence of this province. In a 
way, this depended on the results of the previous actions. The more solid the coalition 
of federal forces under Urquiza’s command and the more able the federation to sustain 
itself economically, the more credible would be the threat to use force as a last resort. 
To strengthen this strategy, Urquiza made an additional move. He attempted to obtain 
the recognition of the federation as a new state (thus making appear the separation of 
Buenos Aires as a simple case of internal sedition) and revive the alliance with Brazil 
and Uruguay that in 1852 helped him to win the war against Buenos Aires.45 
 In sum, the strategy of Urquiza had a double objective. On the one hand, by 
making the federal state self-sufficient he wanted to increase his capacity to hold out 
while negotiations were suspended or even create an outside option if the bargaining 
process finally collapsed. On the other hand, by making more certain the use of force 
in case Buenos Aires remained intransigent, he also wanted to worsen Buenos Aires’ 
alternative to a negotiated agreement. 
 Until the end of his presidential period, and in spite of numerous conflicts in the 
provinces and attempts by Buenos Aires to produce internal divisions, Urquiza was 
able to maintain some unity within the federation. He failed, however, to provide the 
new state with sufficient economic resources to survive on its own. The opening of 
internal rivers to international commerce never really broke the monopoly of the port 
of Buenos Aires, more accessible and better equipped for trade (Scobie 1964: 157-8). 
The availability of foreign credit, in turn, was too scarce to compensate the 
insufficiency of funds. Through time, this situation obviously weakened the bargaining 
position of Urquiza. In the eyes of the political elite in Buenos Aires (whether they 
were moderate nationalist or radical separatists) it was evident that the rest of the 
provinces needed Buenos Aires more than this province needed them. The leaders of 
Buenos Aires had no rush to reach an agreement and, in fact, they realized that the 
more they were able to wait, the more concessions they could expect to obtain from 
the federalists.  
 In the end, however, the greater ability of the leaders of Buenos Aires to hold out 
produced a mixed result. The intransigence of porteño leaders led to a breakdown of 
negotiations. In 1859, Urquiza finally decided to initiate a new war against Buenos 
                                                
44 See letter of Alberdi to Urquiza of October 21 1852, in Cárcano (1938: 18-19) 
45 As it was noted, the alliance with Uruguay and Brazil was created in 1852 to support Urquiza in his 
war against Rosas. The participation of Uruguay and Brazil was at the time motivated by the interest 
of these countries in breaking the blockade imposed by Buenos Aires on the navigation of the River 
Plate system by foreign ships. With the accomplishment of this objective, the alliance was dismantled. 
   29 
    
 
Aires in which the latter was defeated. 46 The immediate consequence of this result 
was an agreement where Buenos Aires was forced to accept its integration to the 
federation under political conditions equal to those of the other provinces.  At the 
same time, however, this was an agreement in which Buenos Aires obtained several 
concessions from the federalists. In spite of having lost the war against the federation, 
Buenos Aires did not accept the constitution as it was written in 1853 in all its parts. A 
condition for incorporation, as we will see, was a constitutional reform in which 
Buenos Aires was able to postpone the immediate nationalization of the rents of its 
port, avoid the federalization of the city of Buenos Aires as capital of the nation, 
reduce the powers of the central government and eliminate some of the discretionary 
powers of the president. In other words, while the federalists obtained the integration 
of Buenos Aires in a constitution that maintained some of the essential traits of its 
original design, neither actor was ultimately able to induce the others to accept his 
most preferred set of institutions. 
  
 4.2 The reforms of 1860 and the integration of Buenos Aires 
  
 In 1857, the Minister of Interior sent a note to the governor of Buenos Aires 
inviting this province to examine the constitution of 1853. Implicitly, this was an offer 
to negotiate some constitutional reforms even though the constitution was not 
supposed to be amended until 1863. The government of Buenos Aires, then in hands 
of Valentín Alsina, a radical opponent of Urquiza and the federalists, rejected the 
offer.47 Knowing the already weak economic position of the federation, the governor 
speculated that at this point there was an additional reason to hold out. With 
presidential re-election precluded by the constitution, Urquiza would finish his term in 
1859. This opened the possibility that a new president, probably more debilitated than 
Urquiza, could be forced to make extensive concessions in exchange for the 
integration of Buenos Aires to the federation.  
 Given this context, by the early months of 1859 Urquiza faced two interrelated 
choices: whether to continue in power after the end of his term and whether to launch 
a military attack to incorporate Buenos Aires by force. The end of Urquiza´s 
presidency without the incorporation of Buenos Aires could mean both the collapse of 
his future political influence and the likely defeat of his effort to achieve national unity 
in terms favorable to provincial interests. In this situation, one possible plan, supported 
by some members of the government, was to obtain the re-election of Urquiza against 
the explicit proscription of the constitution.48 Urquiza was able to do that given the 
support he was still able to obtain among a majority of provincial governors. This 
option would eliminate the immediate problem of presidential succession and perhaps 
                                                
46 The break of a war is an indication that Urquiza´s threat to launch a successful military attack might 
not have been credible in the eyes of the leaders of Buenos Aires. As Jon Elster points out, the fact 
that a threat has to be carried out, obviously shows it has not worked. See Elster (1995d) 
47 Valentín Alsina, leader of the rebellion of 1852 and governor of Buenos Aires for a brief period, 
was elected governor again this year. 
48 In relation to this alternative, see the letter that Alberdi sent to Urquiza on May 6, 1859, in Cárcano 
(1938: 523-33)  
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secure the survival of the coalition that sustained the federal state. The continuity of 
Urquiza, however, would preclude the possibility of any future negotiation with 
Buenos Aires. With the government of Buenos Aires under the control of the radical 
group, the latter would never accept a negotiation with the federalists if Urquiza 
remained as president. This meant that an open war would be the only option left to 
achieve the integration of Buenos Aires.  
 From this perspective, it is necessary to analyze what was a stake in a war 
between the federalists and Buenos Aires. If Urquiza considered that his probability of 
success was high, a war could be perhaps the best choice. The defeat of Buenos Aires  
could force the resignation of governor Valentín Alsina and induce Buenos Aires to 
negotiate its incorporation under a new governor, perhaps a moderate more inclined 
than Alsina to a negotiated agreement with Urquiza. The probability of success, 
however, was uncertain. Urquiza spent the whole year of 1858 desperately seeking 
support from Brazil or Uruguay in case of a war against Buenos Aires. This support 
was crucial to block the entrance of ships to the port of Buenos Aires and break the 
capacity of the city to resist a long siege. Yet, this help never came. This meant that 
short of a rapid defeat, the situation of 1853, a long and costly siege of the city of 
Buenos Aires, could be repeated.  
 Between April and May of 1859 Urquiza finally made two crucial decisions. In 
the first place, he decided to leave the presidential office to a person of his choosing so 
that he could have control of the future government without violating the proscription 
of re-election imposed by the constitution.49 At the same time, right after proclaiming 
Santiago Derqui (his Minister of Interior and close adviser) as future presidential 
candidate, Urquiza decided to risk of a war against Buenos Aires.  
 The outcome of this war has been traditionally regarded as a puzzle in Argentine 
history. While Urquiza managed to obtain a quick victory over Buenos Aires, he 
backed down from destroying the armed forces of this province and imposing a total 
defeat. Urquiza let the leader of the porteño army escape with most of his forces intact 
and avoided entering the city. He also invited Buenos Aires to negotiate the conditions 
of its integration rather than dictating them. Why?  
 The rationale of this action may become clear when analyzed in the context of the 
bargaining game between Urquiza and the leaders of Buenos Aires. The defense of 
Buenos Aires was in charge of Mitre, a moderate who was by then one of the strongest 
candidates for governor of Buenos Aires. Given that some form of voluntary 
agreement was ultimately desirable, this meant that Urquiza had to save Mitre’s face if 
he wanted to preserve the latter as a potential substitute of incumbent governor 
Valentín Alsina in the negotiations (Tonelli 1995: 22). This interpretation of events 
might explain why Urquiza limited himself to demand the resignation of Alsina and 
the negotiation of a peace agreement preparing the integration of Buenos Aires to the 
federation. 
 On November 11, Urquiza and Buenos Aires signed an agreement establishing the 
conditions for the incorporation of the latter to the federal state. In an apparent 
                                                
49 In this respect, Urquiza seemed to have followed the advice of Alberdi. Se the letter Alberdi sent to 
Urquiza on May 6, 1859, in Cárcano (1938: 523). 
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paradox, the defeated party obtained several concessions. The reason for this attitude 
on the part of Urquiza was probably the same as for limiting the extent of his military 
victory: he knew that only by making some concessions to the moderates in the city 
would they be able to keep the radicals at bay and reach a rapid agreement. 
 Buenos Aires was forced, of course, to resign its status as a separate state. Yet, its 
incorporation to the federal state would not be made without first providing some 
guarantees. In the first place, Buenos Aires was given the option between accepting 
the constitution as it was approved in 1853 and proposing reforms. In the last 
circumstance, a national convention, in which Buenos Aires could appoint delegates 
according to population, would be in charge of accepting or rejecting the reforms. 
There would be no ratification requirement for the decisions of this convention, but 
Buenos Aires would not be forced to accept any division of its territory without 
previous consent. In particular, it could not be forced to accept the federalization of the 
city or the division of the province. According to the agreement, the customhouse of 
Buenos Aires would be nationalized. Yet, Buenos Aires would maintain the same level 
of rents as in 1859 until five years after its final incorporation (Sampay 1975: 381-84). 
 Buenos Aires decided to call a provincial convention on February of 1860 and, as 
one could expect, it proposed several reforms to the federal constitution. In spite of the 
extension of the reforms and the fact that some of them were obviously intended to 
protect the political and economic interests of Buenos Aires, they were accepted 
without relevant opposition by a national convention formed in September.  
The general logic of the reform was oriented toward a stronger defense of 
provincial interests against potential encroachments of the central government and a 
certain limitation of presidential powers. The delegates at the Buenos Aires convention 
made public their disagreement with the rule of equal representation of the states in the 
Senate, but did not insist in changing this rule. Evidently, they knew that such reform 
would never be accepted by the national convention. Given this constraint, the 
convention decided to eliminate some of the previous powers of the Senate such as its 
exclusive initiative to propose constitutional amendments. Regarding the powers of 
the central government, the reform eliminated the revision of provincial constitutions 
by the national Congress, its right to impeach provincial governors, and the power of 
the federal judiciary to intervene in conflicts between different branches of provincial 
governments. The institution of federal intervention was maintained, but request by 
local authorities was necessary in cases of internal rebellion or invasion by other 
provinces. The federal government could only act by itself in cases of foreign attack or 
to defend the republican form of government.  
With respect to presidential powers, the main target of the reform was to eliminate 
areas of discretionary authority. The institution of the state of siege, for instance, was 
preserved but the reform would eliminate the possibility that the president could 
declare it when the Congress is in session. Following a similar logic, the delegates 
from Buenos Aires proposed that the president could not make permanent 
appointments that require consent of the Senate during the recession of Congress. In 
other words, a relatively strong presidential office, particularly regarding the power to 
intervene in internal conflicts, was maintained.  The future executive, however, would 
have a more limited capacity to decide in these cases by his own authority.  
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 The delegates at the convention justified these reforms arguing that they would 
make the Argentine constitution more compatible with the logic of the American 
constitution, the supposed model on which it was based. Delegate Sarmiento, the 
liberal thinker who in the 1840s celebrated with Alberdi the virtues of centralism and 
concentration of powers in the executive, was now the main speaker of this position. 
According to his view, the constitution of 1853 (as well as its precedent, Alberdi’s 
project) was not an original creation but just an imitation—and a bad one at that—of 
the American constitution. Sarmiento depicted the “originalities” of the constitution, 
like the idea of a centralized federation or the strong emergency powers of the 
executive as deviations from the original model that only the ignorance or the bad faith 
of the designers could explain. Put it differently, according to Sarmiento, either the 
delegates did not know much about constitutional law or they were consciously 
making a constitution to meet the needs of Urquiza. In any case, he saw the 
constitution as an incoherent text that invited national authorities to abuse their 
power.50  
 Following these ideas, the report of the convention argued that the concept of 
federation was perverted in 1853 with “the deceitful excuse of originality.”(Asambleas 
4: 769). But there can be no originality, according to the same report, in matters where 
Argentina had no experience. How can Argentine constitution-makers, asked the 
report, decide the proper balance of power between the central government and the 
provinces if the idea of federal law had no precedents in this country? (Asambleas 4: 
769). The Argentine federation, delegate Velez Sarfield argued, was always an 
invention borrowed from United States (Asambleas 4: 791). If Argentines wanted a 
federation, or so the argument went, they should go back to the sources.  
 Although these arguments were formulated in impartial terms, it is clear they were 
mostly strategic. The American constitution, no doubt, was attractive to the delegates. 
It was a commonplace among the liberal elites of the time to admire the economic and 
political success of the American federalists. Yet, like Sarmiento few years before, 
many of the porteño delegates shared the view that the institutional model of the 
American constitution did not suit the political conditions of a country like 
Argentina.51 In fact, the real problem for the delegates was not centralized government  
or a strong presidency but a government controlled by interests inimical to Buenos 
Aires. Expecting to be a minority in the new state, representatives of Buenos Aires 
naturally tried to eliminate those institutions that were dangerous for the independence 
and autonomy of the provinces—now including Buenos Aires itself, like the revision 
of provincial constitutions by Congress.  
                                                
50 The new institutional views of Sarmiento were known in 1853, when after making public his 
disagreements with Urquiza´s leadership, engaged in a polemic with Alberdi about the meaning and 
interpretation of the new constitution. Sarmiento argued that the since the source of the constitution of 
1853 was the American constitution, the fomer should be interpreted and applied according to the 
constitutional jurisprudence of the United States, particularly in those aspects were it seems to depart 
from the precedent.  Alberdi, in turn, argued that the constitution was an original creation that should 
be interpreted and applied according to national precedents. See Sarmiento, Obras Completas 
(1909),Vol. VIII, and Alberdi, Obras Selectas (1920), Vol. X.   
51 Indeed, some of the delegates were well-known sympathizers of a centralist state. 
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 As a hedge against an uncertain future, the delegates from Buenos Aires also had 
an interest in restraining the power of the executive to act in cases of internal conflict. 
Since the presidency was currently in hands of federalist forces and they could not  
predict yet who will control it in the future, people like Mitre or Sarmiento, otherwise 
defenders of a strong executive authority, were now advocating a limitation of 
emergency powers and powers of federal intervention. From this perspective, it should 
not be surprising that few years later, when the same actors gained control of the 
presidency, they would renege in practice the same principles they were now 
defending in theory.52   
 More complex is perhaps to explain why did Urquiza, then commander in chief of 
the national army and governor of Entre Ríos, and Derqui, the new president of the 
federation, supported these reforms. We can also find in this context the presence of 
strong strategic reasons. Urquiza had two interrelated objectives at the time. On the 
one hand, he wanted to exercise national influence from his position of power in Entre 
Ríos. His province was the most important center of economic and military power of 
the federation and, as such, the only real counterweight to the influence of Buenos 
Aires over the national government. On the other hand, Urquiza wanted to preserve his 
control over President Derqui. In both respects, it is clear that the attenuation of the 
powers of the central government and the president, was not against his immediate 
political interests.  
 President Derqui, in turn, though he surely disliked the reforms, was in a weak 
position to oppose the demands of Buenos Aires. Since June of 1860, at least, it was 
evident that he wanted independence from Urquiza in the conduction of the national 
government. He could only do that, however, by obtaining support from Buenos Aires. 
In this sense, accepting a decrease in his future powers can be read as the price paid by 
Derqui to neutralize the influence of his own creator.  
 The document that resulted from the reforms of 1860 sealed then an institutional 
compromise in which the interests of all the relevant political actors would be 
protected or at least not seriously threatened in the presence of changing political 
conditions. Like in the original pact between Urquiza and provincial leaders, the 
governors would maintain their spheres of local influence in exchange for support to 
the national government. The national government and particularly the president 
would maintain essential instruments of control over the provinces, such as the power 
of federal intervention and the state of siege. The attenuation of the most centralist 
features of the constitution of 1853 provided the leaders of Buenos Aires and the 
leader of Entre Ríos, the second most powerful province, additional guarantees that 
their positions of power would not be altered by the eventual alternation of different 
interests in the presidency. 
 Although this institutional compromise would prove to be successful in creating a 
stable constitutional government in Argentina, the effective application of the new 
constitution took two more years and a new war from which Buenos Aires finally 
gained the command of the national government. Right before the formal 
                                                
52 On the use of presidential power during the presidencies of Mitre and Sarmiento, see Matienzo 
(1910).   
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incorporation of Buenos Aires to the federation, the political conflicts between Derqui 
and Urquiza created a situation that played in the hands of Bartolome Mitre, governor 
of Buenos Aires since 1860.  
 By 1861, the cohesiveness of the federal coalition was completely broken: the 
provinces were already divided between supporters of Mitre, Urquiza and Derqui. In 
September of that year, Mitre provoked a new war, which he knew Urquiza had 
neither the interest nor the clear capacity to win. In the battle of Pavón, after a farce of 
combat, Urquiza withdraw his troops and let Mitre proclaim the victory. In one year, 
previous resignation of Derqui, Mitre was being elected president of the federation.  
 
 
Conclusions: the origins of a presidential republic 
 
I have argued in this article that the constitution of 1853-60 can be explained at 
two different, but in the end complementary, levels of analysis. In its general aspects, 
such as the presidential form of government and some areas of executive power, it was 
mainly the result of a conservative brand of liberalism concerned with the creation of 
political order and the building of effective state power in a context of territorial 
fragmentation and civil strife. In matters of detail and distributional issues, however, 
the final design emerged from a protracted bargaining process, punctuated by the use 
of force. In this respect, different expectations about the future and different levels of 
bargaining power among the main actors were crucial in determining the outcome of 
the constitution-making process. 
For more than four decades, the country experienced a stalemate between 
federalists in the interior and littoral provinces and anti-federalists in Buenos Aires. As 
we have seen, this situation was only solved in 1852, when in alliance with neighbor 
countries, the governor of Entre Ríos was able to defeat Buenos Aires and create a 
federalist constitution with the support of local leaders. The constitution was made 
under the influence of Urquiza, military leader of the federalist coalition and sure 
candidate to the presidency. Given the primary interest of provincial governors in 
incorporating Buenos Aires, Urquiza was able to demand and obtain from them a 
broad delegation of powers to organize a constitution-making process aimed at 
preventing the likely opposition of this province. Urquiza personally selected or 
supervised the names of most delegates, no ratification process in the provinces was 
required, and the principle of simple majority was observed to adopt decisions at the 
convention. All provinces, in addition, would have an equal number of representatives.  
 While these rules would effectively weaken the bargaining position of Buenos 
Aires at the convention, they would also make possible for Urquiza and his supporters 
at the convention to adopt institutions with a relative degree of autonomy from the 
governors. This autonomy was translated in the creation of a central government and 
particularly a presidential office with important means of control over the provinces. 
While Congress was invested with the authority to revise provincial constitutions and 
impeach governors, the president obtained the most important residual powers to act in 
cases of internal conflict. Such were the powers to decide the suspension of 
constitutional guarantees and declare the intervention of provinces in cases where the 
Congress was not in session.  
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 The power of Urquiza over the governors, however, was never absolute. Although 
the approval of the constitution did not require formal ratification by the provinces, it 
was clear that, to be accepted, the constitution should contain some minimal 
safeguards to protect the interests of local governors. Some of these safeguards were 
the separation of power between executive and legislature, the indirect election of 
presidents by electors from the provinces, bicameralism, the rule of equal 
representation in the Senate, and, above all, the local election of governors. One 
should note, however, that the most important mechanism in hands of the governors to 
check the power of the national government resided in their de facto control over local 
elections. Due to this control, the governors were not only arbiters in the election of 
presidents but also the ones who decided the level of legislative support that presidents 
would have in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. 
This constitutional arrangement was unacceptable for the leaders of Buenos Aires. 
After the military defeat of the province, the creation of a federal state could not be 
disputed. Yet, there were different areas of design where porteño leaders could expect 
to obtain a better agreement, such as one adopting proportional rules of representation 
in the Senate. Being a sure minority in the future, they also wanted a more limited 
central power and a relatively weaker presidential office than the one created by the 
federalists. This was the reason why the province would finally reject participation in 
the convention and resist its integration to the federation for seven years. 
 While the negotiations that preceded the integration of Buenos Aires gave many 
concessions to this province, in the end, neither Urquiza nor the leaders of Buenos 
Aires were able to induce the other to accept an agreement in their own terms. Since 
the union of all federal forces had the potential to defeat Buenos Aires in an open war, 
Urquiza attempted to use this capacity as a threat in case of a total breakdown of 
negotiations. This military advantage of the federalists, however, was never so great as 
to permit imposing on Buenos Aires an easy or rapid defeat.  
 The financial position of the federalists was weak and a relatively long war would 
have for them an enormous cost. Buenos Aires, in turn, had sufficient material 
resources to survive while negotiations were suspended and even resist for some time 
a military attack, in case of a failure of negotiations. This is the reason why the 
strategies of radical separatists and moderate nationalist in Buenos Aires eventually 
converged. While the intransigence of separatists forced the federalists to launch a war 
against Buenos Aires, the impatience of the federalists to reach an agreement led to a 
compromise with the moderates in which the province obtained partial satisfaction of 
its demands. The leaders of Buenos Aires did not succeed in introducing rules of 
proportional representation or eliminate all the centralizing features of the constitution 
that were a threat to their interests. They did succeed, however, in placing several 
limitations to the powers of the central government and the president as well as delay 
the immediate and complete nationalization of the rents of the port. 
 The system of distribution of power that emerged from this process was, as I 
argued in the introduction, an odd mixture of power-concentrating and power-sharing 
elements. While a federalist state was created, the central government in general and 
the president in particular were able to control local powers by means of the institution 
of federal intervention. Although some checks-and balances principles were adopted in 
the organization of executive-legislative relations, the president was invested with 
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strong emergency powers that could turn him into a hegemonic actor in situations of 
internal conflict. It was unlikely that under conditions of open political competition 
this system of distribution of powers could provide mutual guarantees for government 
and opposition. Yet, given the conditions of limited competition and electoral control 
under which the constitution was created, the design of the constitution of 1853-60 
became a source of stability for seven decades. Let me analyze this point in more 
detail. 
 Many issues, like the federalization of the city of Buenos Aires, remained 
unresolved after the compromise of 1860. The institutions that emerged from the 
latter, however, created a lasting equilibrium among the interests of the main political 
actors. While presidents were invested with strong emergency powers to regulate 
internal conflict, they were also forced to compete for electoral support in the 
provinces in order to be elected and form a solid legislative support. According to this 
arrangement, the president would protect the authority of provincial governors in their 
local spheres of influence as long as governors collaborated in supporting the president 
in office. The whole logic of the system, however, was sustained by an informal norm: 
the control of local elections by the governors. Local control of elections made 
possible not only the formation and perpetuation of local oligarchies but also provided 
a reliable source of political support to the president. On the one hand, it could give 
the president a stable majority support during his term in both the Senate and the 
Chamber of Deputies. On the other hand, given the participation of the provinces in 
the election of presidents, local control of elections could also sustain a national 
system of control of presidential succession.   
 Urquiza (1854-60) was the first president who controlled his own succession by 
appointing Santiago Derqui (1860-62) as the president who would complete the task of 
national unification. The growing conflicts between Urquiza and Derqui, however, led 
to the disintegration of the federalist coalition that sustained Urquiza’s government. 
Neither Mitre (1862-68) nor Sarmiento (1868-74) were able to reestablish a stable 
alliance with provincial governors in order to control the mechanism of presidential 
succession. Since the election of Avellaneda (1874-80), however, this alliance was 
again in place and was able to overcome the dissent of some members of the elite, like 
Mitre, who protested the manipulation of electoral results. By the election of Roca, in 
1880, the alliance between the central government and a majoritarian coalition of 
provinces already became the symbol of a hegemonic system of oligarchic domination 
known as National Autonomist Party (PAN).53  
 The existence of informal agreements between regional oligarchies and the central 
authority on the rules of political competition played a strategic role in the observance 
of constitutional rules for the transfer of power (Negretto and Aguilar Rivera 2000). 
While neither presidents nor governors could be re-elected, the mechanism of electoral 
control provided them with an influence over their successors that reduced the 
temptation of an extra-legal continuation in power or the promotion of constitutional 
reforms to establish the possibility of re-election. At the same time, once they left 
power, a large number of governors and several presidents also found a place in 
                                                
53 On the formation and consolidation of this system, see Botana (1985: 74-5) 
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institutions, like the Senate, from where they could continue exercising political 
influence or wait until they could be re-elected (Botana 1985: 110-12). In this sense, 
although the system prevented a real alternation in power between different parties it 
did facilitate a limited circulation of power among different fractions of the elite.  
 The practice of sharing power by inter-elite agreements and electoral control 
became part of a complex set of arrangements aimed at lowering the stakes of political 
competition and restraining the power of majorities. This was particularly the case of 
the competition for the presidency, the highest prize in the system, but it also applied 
to the competition for seats in the Chamber of Deputies, which according to the 
constitution should be distributed by simple majority rule. Some formal institutions 
created in 1853 interacted with informal norms to produce a similar practice of sharing 
power. Such was the case of separation of powers, federalism, bicameralism, or the 
indirect election of presidents. A system of independent courts, which since 1864 
received the power of judicial review, also integrated the set of guarantees provided to 
minority interests. Finally, a highly stringent amendment procedure, requiring two-
thirds of the vote of Congress to convoke a constituent convention, mandated the 
necessary agreement with the minority to approve changes to constitutional rules.  
 Over time, however, the system of mutual balances inscribed in the constitution 
and in informal practices was gradually destroyed, as the presidency became an 
increasingly independent and dominant institution. From 1862 to 1880, the federal 
intervention and the state of siege were applied 27 and 15 times, respectively, in most 
cases by executive decree (Botana 1993: 235; Molinelli 1991: 136-7). These measures 
were aimed at eliminating the old-style provincial caudillos who defied the national 
government or attempted the creation of regional hegemonies by invading or 
intervening in the local affairs of other provinces. This process, however, culminated 
by 1880, when after the federalization of the city of Buenos Aires, no real opposition 
remained to counterbalance the powers of the central government.  
 From 1880 to 1916, the coercive powers of the president were less visible. The 
use of state of siege became less frequent and federal interventions were declared most 
of the time by congressional law (Molinelli 1991: 136). This greater involvement of 
Congress, however, signaled less a decrease in the power of the president than his 
stronger command over stable legislative majorities during the period of the PAN 
domination. As Botana has observed, following the analysis of Sommariva, the use of 
federal intervention in this period played a more central role both in the control of 
potential oppositions within the coalition of provinces that supported the president and 
in the regulation of local conflicts (Botana 1985: 131). In the latter cases, the 
intervention was not always directed to preserve the existing authorities and, in fact, in 
most cases where they were declared without request from local authorities, the federal 
government tended to support opposition groups (Botana 1985: 133). This use of the 
federal intervention, in which the central government reserved for itself the role of an 
arbiter, indicates a more effective use of the institution as an instrument of political 
manipulation. 
 Ultimately, the stability of the constitution was closely dependent on its ability to 
provide political space and influence to actors with veto power over the system. As 
long as all the relevant political groups felt that their interests were sufficiently 
protected under the existing arrangements, no major challenge emerged. Over time, 
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however, the liberal regime produced different exclusions. By the 1890s, various 
opposition groups were formed demanding political participation by means of open 
and free elections. The largest and most important of these groups was the Radical 
Civic Union (UCR), which rejected any form of compromise short of a comprehensive 
and effective electoral reform. 
 In 1912, after successive attempts to co-opt the opposition and under the threat of 
growing political unrest, president Roque Saenz Peña finally agreed with the leader of 
the UCR, Hipólito Yrigoyen, an electoral reform that would grant fair and competitive 
elections. This pact sealed the demise of the liberal republic and, with it, also the end 
of the stability of the old constitution.  
 Once free competition for power was allowed, the traditional parties of the liberal 
republic experienced a gradual decline in popular support until in 1916 Yrigoyen won 
the presidency. In the eyes of the new president, his election meant not simply a 
change of government but a transition from an oligarchic to a democratic regime in 
which the old political class should have no place. Accordingly, Yrigoyen felt no 
political constraints to use the powers of the executive, like those of federal 
intervention, to reduce the institutional space of the traditional parties, still strong in 
the provinces and the Senate. The response of the latter did not take long. Unable to 
regain control of the presidency by means of competitive elections, the old elite 
retaliated by supporting a conservative coup that put an end to the democratic 
experience in 1930.  
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